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UNITED STATES v. DIRE: SOMALI PIRATES, 
AND THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S CHOICE TO 
APPLY AN EVOLVING “LAW OF NATIONS” 
TO THE PROBLEM 
Samuel B. Richard* 
Abstract: Maritime piracy poses a grave threat to global shipping. In the 
United States, federal law criminalizes piracy as defined by international 
law, or the law of nations. Recently, in United States v. Dire, the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals interpreted the law of nations surrounding piracy. 
Dire concerned the conviction of five Somali nationals under the piracy 
statute. The defendants argued that piracy requires a robbery, and since 
no robbery occurred, their convictions should be overturned. Examining 
two differing approaches by lower District Courts, the Fourth Circuit con-
cluded that piracy does not require robbery because the law of nations 
evolves with changing international consensus, rather than maintaining a 
static definition. This consensus stems from international agreements, 
such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, whose def-
inition of piracy lacks a robbery element. Therefore, the court upheld the 
convictions. Dire may potentially change the way U.S. courts apply inter-
national law. 
Introduction 
 Maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia poses a grave danger to 
commercial shipping in the region.1 Estimates place the cost of pirate 
raids in the billions.2 Since pirates operate supra-nationally, targeting 
vessels and crewmembers from around the world, these attacks are dif-
ficult for individual states to police.3 In an attempt to provide unanim-
ity to more efficiently combat this issue, the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a global accord signed by 162 States 
                                                                                                                      
* Samuel B. Richard is a Staff Writer for the Boston College International & Comparative 
Law Review. 
1 See Jim Michaels, Pirates’ New Tactics Make Navies’ Job Harder, USA Today, Jan. 7, 2011, 
at A6. In 2009 and 2010, pirates attacked over 300 ships. See id. 
2 See Lucas Bento, Toward an International Law of Piracy Sui Generis: How the Dual Nature 
of Maritime Piracy Law Enables Piracy to Flourish, 29 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 399, 406–07 (2011). 
3 See Milena Sterio, Fighting Piracy in Somalia (and Elsewhere): Why More Is Needed, 33 
Fordham Int’l L.J. 372, 404 (2009–2010). 
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concerning maritime issues, includes a piracy definition.4 Despite the 
efforts of UNCLOS, there still exists a large need for further interna-
tional agreement on the legal classification of piracy, as not every state 
is a signatory.5  In 2012, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, despite 
the United States not being party to UNCLOS, joined its consensus and 
applied the treaty’s standard to 18 U.S.C. § 1651, the federal crime of 
piracy on the high seas.6 United States v. Dire resolved a split between two 
district courts interpreting the statute, which labels piracy as “defined 
by the law of nations.”7 The law of nations refers to the body of com-
mon law “deducible by natural reason, and established by universal 
consent among the civilized inhabitants of the world . . . .”8 Congress 
has the power to enact such laws through the define and punish clause 
of the United States Constitution.9 
 The key disagreement between the lower courts centered on 
whether or not piracy requires robbery.10 One viewed the statute 
through the prism of international law present at the statute’s enact-
ment, which in that court’s opinion included this element.11 The other 
chose not to require robbery because congressional intent commanded 
the application of current global criterion.12 The Fourth Circuit upheld 
the latter, ruling that § 1651 evolves with international custom.13 This 
                                                                                                                      
4 See Yvonne M. Dutton, Maritime Piracy and the Impunity Gap: Insufficient National Laws 
or a Lack of Political Will?, 86 Tul. L. Rev. 1111, 1121–22 (2012). See generally United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea, pmbl., Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [herein-
after UNCLOS]. Article 101 defines piracy as: “any illegal acts of violence . . . committed 
for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship . . . on the high seas, against 
another ship . . . .” UNCLOS, id. 
5 See Christopher Joyner, Navigating Troubled Waters: Somalia, Piracy, and Maritime Terror-
ism, 10 Geo. J. Int’l Aff. 83, 86 (2009). 
6 See Daniel Pines, Maritime Piracy: Changes in U.S. Law Needed to Combat This Critical Na-
tional Security Concern, 36 Seattle U. L. Rev. 69, 89 (2012); see also United States v. Dire, 
680 F.3d 446, 459, 469 (4th Cir. 2012). 
7 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (1948); see Dire, 680 F.3d at 451–52. 
8 Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress’s Power to “Define and Punish . . . 
Offenses Against the Law of Nations”, 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 447, 463 (2000) (citing 4 Wil-
liam Blackstone, Commentaries 66). 
9 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
10 Compare United States v. Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d 554, 559 (E.D. Va. 2010), vacated, 680 
F.3d 374 (4th Cir. 2012) (requiring robbery), with United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 
599, 623 (E.D. Va. 2010) (not requiring robbery). 
11 See Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 567. 
12 See Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 623. 
13 See Dire, 680 F.3d at 469. 
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decision has the potential to dramatically affect how courts assess future 
and current statutes.14 
 Part I of this Comment provides a brief summary of the facts of 
Dire and examines its procedural history. Part II analyzes the legal basis 
for the two judicial readings of § 1651, and the logic behind the Fourth 
Circuit’s opinion to not require robbery. Finally, Part III discusses 
whether it is prudent to apply UNCLOS’s definition to § 1651, and the 
broader impact this may have on the application of international law 
within the United States. 
I. Background 
 United States v. Dire arose out of an incident on April 1, 2010, when 
five men,15 operating in international waters, utilized a rocket-propelled 
grenade and AK-47s to assault the USS Nicholas, a U.S. Navy frigate dis-
guised as a merchant ship.16 After exchanging gunfire, the military cap-
tured, detained, and brought the men to the United States.17 A grand 
jury indicted the defendants on numerous charges, including piracy 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1651, which states that: “[w]hoever, on the high seas, 
commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations . . . shall be 
imprisoned for life.”18 
 Prior to trial, the defendants moved to dismiss the piracy charge.19 
They contested that the law of nations delineated by § 1651 must be 
narrowly interpreted as “robbery at sea.”20 Because the defendants nei-
ther boarded the USS Nicholas, nor took property, they argued their 
actions did not constitute piracy.21 The district court, hearing this mo-
tion in United States v. Hasan (Hasan I ),22 held that § 1651 is a unique, 
universal jurisdiction crime governed by current international norms.23 
Hasan I stated that UNCLOS’s piracy definition pertained to § 1651 
                                                                                                                      
14 See id.; Michael T. Morley, Note, The Law of Nations and the Offenses Clause of the Consti-
tution: A Defense of Federalism, 112 Yale L.J. 109, 114 (2002). 
15 United States v. Dire, 680 F.3d 446, 449–51 (4th Cir. 2012). All Somalis, the defen-
dants are Abdi Wali Dire, Gabul Abdullahi Ali, Abdi Mohammed Umar, Abdi Mohammed 
Gurewardher, and Mohammed Modin Hasan. Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 449. 
18 Id. at 450; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (1948). 
19 Dire, 680 F.3d at 451. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 See id. at 451 n. 3. The difference in lead defendants between Hasan I and Dire is due 
to Dire being the first to file for appeal. See id. 
23 See id. at 454; see also United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 623 (E.D. Va. 
2010). 
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because it represented such a global standard.24 Hasan I also noted that 
UNCLOS is similar to the Geneva Convention on the High Seas (High 
Seas Convention), which the United States had ratified.25 Since UN-
CLOS requires illegal acts of violence like the defendants’, and not 
robbery, Hasan I denied the motion.26 The jury found the five defen-
dants guilty of all charges.27 
 On Dire’s appeal, the Fourth Circuit recognized that these facts 
bore similarities to another case, United States v. Said, where defendants 
had attacked a vessel without seizing the ship.28 In Said, the district 
court held that the statute’s text and stare decisis required that the defi-
nition of piracy entail robbery.29 Given the choice of upholding either 
court, Dire relied on Hasan I after examining the difference between 
§ 1651 and other statutes based on the law of nations.30 In conjunction, 
the Fourth Circuit issued a companion opinion rejecting Said’s hold-
ing, and remanding the case.31 
II. Discussion 
 United States v. Dire elucidated a divergence between United States v. 
Said and United States v. Hasan (Hasan I ) over the principles used to in-
terpret § 1651.32 These differing methods stemmed from the lack of an 
explicit definition of the law of nations in the United States Constitu-
tion.33 The Constitution only references international law once.34 The 
Define and Punish Clause gives Congress the power: “[t]o define and 
punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses 
against the Law of Nations.”35 Although this clause grants the authority 
to enact 18 U.S.C. § 1651, it offers no guidance as to what precise law of 
nations to apply.36 This lack of direction precipitated the division be-
                                                                                                                      
24 See Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 640. 
25 See id. at 620; Pines, supra note 6 at 89. 
26 See Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 640–42. 
27 Dire, 680 F.3d at 450. The defendants received sentences of life plus 80 years. Id. 
28 See id. at 450–51. 
29 See id. at 451–54; see also United States v. Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d 554, 559 (E.D. Va. 
2010), vacated, 680 F.3d 374 (4th Cir. 2012). The government appealed the court’s ruling 
in Said. See Dire, 680 F.3d at 452 n. 5. 
30 See Dire, 680 F.3d at 466–69. 
31 See Dire, 680 F.3d at 452 n. 5; see also United States v. Said, 680 F.3d 374, 375 (4th Cir. 
2012). 
32 See United States v. Dire, 680 F.3d 446, 551–52 (4th Cir. 2012). 
33 See id. at 551–52; Stephens, supra note 8, at 452. 
34 See Dire, 680 F.3d at 551–52. 
35 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
36 See United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 605 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
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tween Said and Hasan I concerning the proper utilization of the law of 
nations towards § 1651.37 The Fourth Circuit in Dire first explained both 
statutory interpretations before reaching its own conclusion.38 
 The Dire opinion begins by unraveling Said’s limited approach to 
applying the law of nations to piracy.39 Said employed a classic canon of 
statutory interpretation to require robbery.40 It stated that any reading 
of § 1651 had to begin with, “[the law’s] ordinary meaning at the time 
of its enactment.”41 Said recognized that the language of § 1651 origi-
nated in an 1819 law (Act of 1819) passed by Congress.42 Further, Said 
stated that no legislative history suggested that the meaning of piracy 
had changed since.43 Therefore, to the court, the lack of any counter-
vailing congressional intent meant § 1651 reflected customary interna-
tional law from 1819.44 To determine what this custom consisted of, Said 
relied on the United States Supreme Court’s (Supreme Court) 1820 
decision in United States v. Smith, which interpreted the Act of 1819.45 
 In Smith, the Court consulted various sources to determine the law 
of nations concerning piracy.46 Utilizing doctrines espoused by the 
scholarly works of “all the great writers on maritime law,” the Court de-
termined that piracy is robbery committed at sea.47 Said employed this 
definition in its interpretation of § 1651 because it found the precedent 
created in Smith significant.48 Said indicated that the acknowledgement 
of the authority of Smith by other Circuit Courts reinforced this posi-
                                                                                                                      
37 Compare Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 604 (“[T]he Framers understood the law of na-
tions to consist of . . . the general norms governing the behavior of national states with 
each other . . . .”), with United States v. Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d 554, 557 (E.D. Va. 2010), va-
cated, 680 F.3d 374 (4th Cir. 2012) (merely stating that there is a set of international laws 
distinct from domestic United States law). 
38 See Dire, 680 F.3d at 452–53, 67. 
39 See id. at 452. 
40 See Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 559 (citing Dep’t of Labor v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 
U.S. 267, 275 (1994)); see also Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (“It is 
elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the lan-
guage in which the act is framed . . . .”). 
41 See Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 559. 
42 See Dire, 680 F.3d at 452 (citing Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 77, § 5, 3 Stat. 510, 513–14). 
The only major difference between this 1819 statute and § 1651 is that the crime carried a 
sentence of death in 1819, instead of the current mandatory life sentence. See id. 
43 See Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 562. 
44 See id. at 559. 
45 See id. 
46 See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5. Wheat) 153, 160–61 (1820). 
47 See id. at 161–62. 
48 See Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 560. 
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tion.49 In doing so, the Said court rejected any application of UNCLOS 
to § 1651.50 
 Said also did not apply UNCLOS to § 1651 because the court ex-
pressed that the treaty does not adequately define piracy.51 It held that 
despite a piracy definition in UNCLOS that applied to most global 
States, the interpretation of UNCLOS varied.52 No single court enforces 
UNCLOS.53 Various States apply UNCLOS differently, especially with 
regards to punishment, which ranges from three years to life impris-
onment.54 Said warned that because UNCLOS’s piracy definition lacked 
unanimity, it could cause § 1651 to become vague, violating defendants’ 
rights to due process.55 Because vague criminal statutes do not provide 
reasonable and fair notice about what the law is, they are often ren-
dered unconstitutional.56 Said held that a static, unchanging, and clear 
definition of piracy as robbery at sea avoided the issue of constitutional-
ity altogether.57 
 Since the opinion in Dire sought to reconcile two distinct district 
court opinions, after analyzing Said, the Fourth Circuit focused on Ha-
san I’s rejection of a concrete definition of piracy requiring robbery.58 
In contrast to the Said court’s reliance on rules of statutory interpreta-
tion, the court in Hasan I focused on the uniqueness of piracy in rela-
tion to the law of nations.59 Importantly, piracy had long been viewed as 
the only crime with universal jurisdiction.60 According to the opinion, 
even the Framers of the Constitution held this belief: piracy is a strictly 
universal jurisdiction crime.61 Universal jurisdiction allows any state to 
arrest and domestically prosecute pirates captured on the high seas.62 
                                                                                                                      
49 See, e.g., Taveras v. Taveraz, 477 F.3d 767, 772 n. 2 (6th Cir. 2007) (“A fundamental 
element of the offense of piracy is that the acts of robbery . . . .” (emphasis added)); United 
States v. Madera-Lopez, 190 F. App’x 832, 836 (11th Cir. 2006). 
50 See Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 565–66. 
51 See id. at 563. 
52 See id. at 565–66. 
53 See id. at 565. 
54 See id. 
55 See id. at 566. 
56 See Andrew E. Goldsmith, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, Revisited, 
30 Am. J. Crim. L. 279, 284 (2003). 
57 See Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 566. 
58 See Dire, 680 F.3d at 454; Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 623. 
59 Compare Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 602–04 (rejecting an approach solely utilizing 
statutory interpretation), with Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 559 (relying on the plain meaning of 
piracy in the original piracy statute). 
60 See Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 605. 
61 See id. 
62 See id. 
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Hasan I specified that one of the main purposes of the Define and Pun-
ish Clause is to do just this—criminalize piracy subject to universal ju-
risdiction.63 
 After determining the Framers’ intent, Hasan I articulated that 
only laws applying to “general piracy” can exert universal jurisdiction 
over the crime.64 General piracy contravenes the law of nations and is 
limited “to those offenses that the international community agrees con-
stitute piracy.”65 Hasan I ruled that therefore, piracy statutes in the 
United States must apply international law.66 Despite this obligation, 
Congress initially struggled to coherently integrate global custom with 
United States piracy law.67 Because there are no judge-made federal 
criminal statutes, Congress had to explicitly incorporate any interna-
tional definition of piracy into the law.68 Congress eventually settled 
upon the general language of § 1651, embodied in the Act of 1819, to 
subject the definition of piracy to international law.69 
 Hasan I held that this legislative history illustrated congressional 
intent to make § 1651 adaptable enough to broadly apply international 
law to piracy.70 Hasan I indicated that inevitable changes to interna-
tional law might alter the meaning of general piracy.71 To allow for flex-
ibility in response to changing international law, Congress simply refer-
enced the law of nations in § 1651.72 This decision prevented the 
statute from constantly needing to be revised.73 Rather, according to 
Hasan I, “any future change in the definition of general piracy under 
the law of nations would be automatically incorporated into United 
States law.”74 
 In holding that the current international custom controlled, Ha-
san I traced the changes in the definition of piracy to identify such a 
consensus.75 Unlike Said, Hasan I did not view Smith as binding, declar-
ing that it allowed for the possibility that piracy might not always re-
                                                                                                                      
63 See id. 
64 See id. at 605–06. 
65 See id. at 606. 
66 See Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 612–14 (detailing the history of piracy statutes in the 
United States, and how they always meant to criminalize general piracy). 
67 See id. at 609. 
68 See id. at 609–10. 
69 See id. at 614. 
70 See id. at 623. 
71 See id. at 624. 
72 See Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 623–24. 
73 See id. at 624. 
74 See id. 
75 See id. at 630–37. 
2013] Somali Pirates and the Law of Nations 83 
quire robbery.76 Rather, the court considered modern international 
concords that might represent the international definition of piracy.77 
Hasan I utilized these accords because if a large majority of states con-
sistently follow them, treaties like UNCLOS can develop into customary 
international law applicable to non-signatories, including the United 
States.78 
 Hasan I held that while UNCLOS might not be binding as a treaty 
against the United States, its definition of piracy could be applied to 
§ 1651.79 To support this premise, the court mentioned that piracy is 
defined almost identically in UNCLOS as in the High Seas Convention, 
which is binding on the United States.80 Nevertheless, Hasan I held that 
the High Seas Convention did not apply to § 1651 because with only 
sixty-three ratifying states, it did not represent international custom to 
the same extent that UNCLOS potentially could.81 Furthermore, Hasan 
I stated that since President Reagan, every executive administration 
had recognized UNCLOS as international custom on “‘traditional uses’ 
of the ocean” such as piracy.82 
 Since over 160 of the United Nations’ 192 member States are party 
to UNCLOS, Hasan I stated that this represented compelling evidence 
that it embodied customary piracy law.83 The court then ruled that be-
cause UNCLOS signified international custom, its definition of piracy 
did in fact apply to § 1651 specifically.84 This definition does not re-
quire an actual taking, but rather includes “any illegal act of violence or 
detention . . . .”85 Hasan I decided that because the defendants illegally 
and violently attacked the USS Nicholas, the indictment could meet this 
definition, and therefore the court did not dismiss the piracy charge.86 
                                                                                                                      
76 See id. at 622 (“[I]f the definition of piracy under the law of nations can evolve over 
time . . . there is no need to conclusively determine the contours of Smith.”). In the eye of 
the court, this applied even if Smith represented the authoritative definition of piracy in 
1820, since Congress intended the crime of piracy to change with changes to the law of 
nations. Compare id. (holding that Smith did not bind the Fourth Circuit to require robbery 
as an element of robbery), with Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 560 (holding that Smith repre-
sented the clearest precedence on the issue of whether piracy requires robbery). 
77 See Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 635. 
78 See id. at 633. 
79 See id. at 634. 
80 See id. at 633, 633 n. 29. 
81 See id. at 633–34. 
82 See id. at 634 (quotations omitted). 
83 See Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 633–34. 
84 See id. at 635, 640. 
85 See UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 101; see also Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 640. 
86 See Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 641. 
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 After articulating the competing arguments in Said and Hasan I, 
the Fourth Circuit in Dire undertook its own independent inquiry.87 
Although Dire upheld the specific interpretation of § 1651 set forth by 
Hasan I, the Fourth Circuit supplemented the lower court’s analysis in a 
novel manner.88 In particular, the Fourth Circuit focused on the varying 
uses of the law of nations in the language of a variety of statutes.89 
 Dire found that in other instances, Congress had explicitly stated 
that the law of nations of a certain time period should apply.90 In the ab-
sence of such an explicit mention of the international law that gov-
erned a statute, Dire stated that the approach in Hasan I, advocating for 
an evolving law of nations, should be followed.91 Therefore, because 
§ 1651 did not make any mention of which law of nations to use, con-
temporary international law applied.92 The court then agreed that the 
modern definition of piracy could be found in UNCLOS, and that the 
crime did not require robbery.93 
III. Analysis 
 Dire presents two distinct explanations of the law of nations.94 Unit-
ed States v. Said interpreted piracy to require robbery, based on the text 
of § 1651 and stare decisis.95 Hasan I focused on Congress’s underlying 
intent to police general piracy, necessitating a definition incorporating 
evolving international norms that currently do not require robbery.96 
The holdings of these cases are mutually exclusive, since § 1651 cannot 
both require robbery, and not require robbery.97 The Fourth Circuit 
made its choice with its decision in Dire:98 upholding Hasan I, not 
                                                                                                                      
87 See Dire, 680 F.3d at 454, 465, 467–68. 
88 See id. at 467–69. 
89 See id. at 467–68. 
90 See id. at 468. The 4th Circuit reiterated its point by saying that if Congress had 
wished for piracy to require robbery, “the Act of 1819 could easily have been drafted to 
specify that piracy consisted of ‘piracy as defined on March 3, 1819 [the date of enact-
ment], by the law of nations,’ or solely of, as the defendants would have it, ‘robbery upon 
the sea.’” See id. 
91 See id. at 467–68. 
92 See id. at 468–69. 
93 See Dire, 680 F.3d at 469. 
94 See United States v. Dire, 680 F.3d 446, 451–52 (4th Cir. 2012). 
95 See United States v. Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d 554, 567 (E.D. Va. 2010), vacated, 680 F.3d 
374 (4th Cir. 2012). 
96 See United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 640 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
97 Compare Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 640 (requiring robbery), with Said, 757 F. 
Supp. 2d at 567 (not requiring robbery). 
98 See Dire, 680 F.3d at 467. 
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Said.99 Despite the danger of granting Congress broad power to enact 
legislation incorporating international law, Dire must serve as a model 
for tackling the issue of piracy.100 
A. The Said Court’s Faulty Interpretation of Piracy 
 The validity of the holding in Dire is clearer when compared to the 
flawed logic of the Said court.101 The most compelling rationale behind 
the Said opinion asserts that requiring robbery is supported by stare de-
cisis.102 Justice Louis Brandeis wrote that, “[s]tare decisis is usually the 
wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the appli-
cable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.”103 As the only 
Supreme Court decision interpreting the Act of 1819, Smith is binding 
precedent on this narrow issue.104 But even if Smith properly concluded 
that the law of nations then required robbery, it is not relevant if Con-
gress intended the definition to shift.105 
 If § 1651 incorporates a fluid definition of piracy, then there is no 
stare decisis to be honored.106 Smith simply stated that piracy in 1820 re-
quired robbery.107 The opinion never discounted that piracy might 
someday require different elements.108 Therefore § 1651 is not defined 
by the precedent of Smith if the intent of the law is to adjust to chang-
ing circumstances.109 
B. The Need for a Fluid Definition of Piracy 
 Piracy law in the United States must change alongside shifting in-
ternational norms because otherwise the problem cannot be tackled 
on an international level.110 Dire and Hasan I make it clear that Con-
gress intended the United States to assert universal jurisdiction over the 
                                                                                                                      
99 See id. at 453 n. 5, 469. 
100 See Morley, supra note 14 at 111, 114. See generally Dire, 680 F.3d at 469. 
101 See Dire, 680 F.3d at 451–52. 
102 See id. at 451–52; Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 559. 
103 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing). 
104 See Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 559. 
105 See Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 622. 
106 See id. 
107 See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 161 (1820). 
108 See Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 621. 
109 See id. at 622. 
110 See, e.g., Bento, supra note 2 at 400 (“Effective anti-piracy efforts require uniformity 
of law, such that legal solutions suppress piracy internationally rather than treat its symp-
toms in an ad hoc local or regional fashion.”). 
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crime of piracy.111 It is far more difficult to achieve this goal if piracy 
necessitates a fixed definition requiring robbery.112 For example, the 
defendants in Dire contested that a robbery requirement meant they 
could not even be charged with piracy under § 1651.113 But they only 
failed to commit robbery because they attacked the USS Nicholas, an 
armed vessel.114 Just as the pirates in Said, these Somalis lacked the fire-
power to capture a ship sent specifically to prevent an attack on an ac-
tual merchant vessel.115 The intent to commit an act of piracy still ex-
isted.116 The United States cannot adequately enforce § 1651 if the 
mere act of policing it renders it much more difficult to charge defen-
dants with the crime.117 
 Dire adequately address these policy needs.118 Incorporating mod-
ern international law allows the United States to effectively combat pi-
racy.119 The importance of combating piracy through effective prosecu-
tion is clear: Congress’s right to enact laws against piracy is a distinct 
enumerated power.120 A flexible definition of piracy more practically 
and ably reflects the intent of the Framers.121 Congress could have ex-
plicitly stated that piracy requires robbery.122 Instead, as Hasan I illus-
trated, Congress consciously made § 1651 broad enough to allow piracy 
to adapt to changes in international law without constantly having to be 
amended.123 Said ignored this congressional intent when it declared 
that piracy’s definition could not change.124 As Dire properly shows, this 
is a misinterpretation of the law of nations.125 
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C. A Fluid Piracy Definition Does Not Violate Due Process 
 On the other hand, Said correctly emphasized the significance of 
§ 1651 remaining clear rather than vague.126 Given the extreme penalty 
attached to the crime, defendants must reasonably and fairly know what 
constitutes piracy.127 Otherwise, there is a danger that defendants’ 
rights to due process might be violated.128 This notion seemingly lends 
strong support to piracy requiring an act of robbery.129 Such an un-
changing definition is clear and concise.130 Conversely, as stated by the 
Said court, linking piracy to an ever evolving set of international stan-
dards might not provide enough notice to defendants.131 
 This contention is irrelevant because applying UNCLOS’s defini-
tion to § 1651 does not violate due process.132 UNCLOS is supported by 
the vast majority of states in the United Nations.133 Therefore, it is wide-
ly known to represent international piracy law.134 Even though Said may 
correctly claim that UNCLOS is applied differently in distinct states, its 
definition of piracy is still uniform.135 Such an overwhelming consensus 
is not unconstitutionally vague.136 UNCLOS clearly defines piracy as 
illegal acts of violence.137 The defendants reasonably should have 
known at the time of the attack that their actions could be piracy.138 
And because § 1651 expressly states that the law of nations applies to 
piracy, the defendants also received notice that any actions that poten-
tially violated the law of nations could be charged as crimes in the 
United States.139 Due process remained intact for the defendants in 
Dire.140 
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D. A Fluid Definition of Piracy Is Consistent with Notions of Federalism 
 Following Dire’s application of customary law potentially creates 
new problems concerning federalism.141 Mainly, such a reading could 
greatly enhance the power of the federal government to apply current 
international law to the United States.142 This argument states that if 
granted the power to apply contemporary international law, the Define 
and Punish Clause supersedes the other enumerated powers.143 For 
example, Congress could control trade it might not be able to justify 
regulating under the Commerce Clause if the new law conformed to 
contemporary international custom.144 
 These fears are unfounded.145 The Define and Punish Clause is 
mostly concerned with the issue of piracy.146 Piracy is the only crime 
that asserted universal jurisdiction when the Framers drafted the Con-
stitution.147 Hasan I stated that contemporary international law could 
more clearly achieve this aim than a stationary definition requiring 
robbery.148 Because piracy is such a unique law, this is a clear limiting 
principle preventing future courts from holding that the law of nations 
also evolves in other statutes besides § 1651.149 
 The holding in Dire does not grant Congress sweeping new power 
to apply customary international law.150 There are simply not many 
other crimes like piracy that enjoy a unique relationship with the law of 
nations.151 Dire illustrated the distinctive nature of piracy by comparing 
it with other examples of crimes and civil regulations grounded in the 
law of nations.152 Unlike § 1651, many such crimes and regulations ex-
plicitly applied the law of nations at the time Congress enacted the 
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statute.153 The fact that this is not the case in § 1651 provides further 
indication that piracy holds a unique position in federal law.154 Apply-
ing an evolving law of nations to piracy does not mean every other law 
mentioning the law of nations will also change over time.155 
Conclusion 
 An evolving definition of piracy based on international custom and 
the law of nations provides law enforcement with a more effective tool 
for combating such a large problem. This is despite the fact that read-
ing § 1651 textually and requiring a static definition of piracy as rob-
bery at sea is less likely to create vagueness that might violate a defen-
dant’s right to due process. This reading is also backed by precedent 
from the Supreme Court stating that this is what piracy equated to 
when Congress first passed the underlying language of § 1651. Piracy is 
not an ordinary crime; it is one of the few—if not the only—crimes that 
the Framers understood to invoke universal jurisdiction. Its definition is 
closely tied to defining the law of nations. The law of nations represents 
the custom that has arisen from the interactions of states on the global 
stage. Faced with such a unique crime, vagueness concerns are less im-
portant. It is more prudent to use an ever evolving law of nations of pi-
racy in order to reflect changes that take place in the world. 
 The nature of piracy has changed greatly in the nearly two and a 
half centuries since the passage of the Constitution. Pirates do not at-
tack from vessels with sails. They act swiftly and suddenly. Requiring a 
nearly 200 year old definition to apply to the current state of piracy is 
absurd on its face. It provides an inadequate answer to a growing prob-
lem. It is important that the international community be capable of 
stopping piracy. This includes the United States. The Fourth Circuit has 
taken an important step to establishing a legal standard that allows for 
the proper handling of the crime of piracy. Hopefully, other Circuit 
Courts, if ever faced with a similar situation, will follow suit. 
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